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CURRENT PROBLEMS IN SEAMEN'S REMEDIES:
SEAMAN STATUS, RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN
JONES ACT AND LHWCA, AND
UNSEAWORTHINESS ACTIONS BY WORKERS NOT
COVERED BY LHWCA*
David W. Robertson**

INTRODUCTION

This article does not purport to be comprehensive in its coverage
of current problems in seamen's remedies. A number of important issues
presented by the recent jurisprudence are not treated here, including the
measure of damages, punitive damages issues, damages in wrongful death
claims, retaliatory discharge, and choice of law and forum non conveniens problems in foreign seamen's cases. The subtopics indicated in
the title were selected on the basis of their complexity or the frequency
with which decisions involving the problems have arisen.
SEAMAN STATUS

If an injured maritime worker is a seaman, he is entitled to sue his
employer on the basis of the Jones Act,' for unseaworthiness, 2 and for
maintenance and cure. In certain circumstances, he may also sue nonemploying shipowners on the basis of unseaworthiness, 3 and may have
an action under general maritime tort law against other tortfeasors. 4 On
Copyright 1985, by LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW.

The research for this article was completed in September, 1984.
Burleson Professor of Law, University of Texas. Member Texas Bar.
1. 46 U.S.C. § 688 (1983).
2. See, e.g., Mitchell v. Trawler Racer, Inc., 362 U.S. 539, 80 S. Ct. 926 (1960).
3. See infra text accompanying notes 177-204.
4. Access to maritime law remedies, aside from the Longshore and Harbor Workers'
Compensation Act (LHWCA), requires establishing that the injury occurred within the
admiralty jurisdiction. LHWCA coverage is limited by the constitutional concept of admiralty jurisdiction. See Perkins v. Marine Terminals Corp., 673 F.2d 1097 (9th Cir.
1982). But LHWCA coverage is broader than the courts' current view of the reach of
admiralty jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1333. See, e.g., Parker v. South Louisiana
Contractors, Inc., 537 F.2d 113 (5th Cir. 1976). Seamen's actions against employers under
the Jones Act are a fortiori within admiralty jurisdiction. See O'Donnell v. Great Lakes
Dredge & Dock Co., 318 U.S. 36, 63 S. Ct. 488 (1943). Unseaworthiness actions for
injuries aboard ship are within the admiralty jurisdiction by virtue of locality and a
significant relationship to traditional maritime activity. See generally Executive Jet Aviation,
*
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the other hand, an injured maritime worker who is not a seaman
generally is confined to workers' compensation against his employer,'
to a limited form of negligence against non-employer shipowners, 6 and
to an action under general maritime tort law or state law 7 against other
non-employer entities who may injure him.
Because the seaman is accorded special legal protections in American
law, determining seaman status is a matter of significance in many cases,

Inc. v. City of Cleveland, 409 U.S. 249, 93 S. Ct. 493 (1972). See also infra note 7.
Unseaworthiness actions for injuries off the ship are within the admiralty jurisdiction by
virtue of a significant relationship to traditional maritime activity and the Admiralty
Extension Act, 46 U.S.C. § 740 (1983). See Gutierrez v. Waterman S.S. Co., 373 U.S.
206, 83 S. Ct. 1185 (1963); Feehan v. United States Line, Inc., 522 F. Supp. 811 (S.D.N.Y.
1980). Other tort litigation by seamen or other maritime workers must establish admiralty
jurisdiction in order for the general maritime tort law to apply. General maritime tort
law includes negligence, free of many common-law duty limits, Kermarec v. Compagnie
Generale Transatlantique, 358 U.S. 625, 79 S. Ct. 406 (1959), as well as strict liability
for defective products; Lewis v. Timco, Inc., 716 F.2d 1425 (5th Cir. 1983) (en banc).
If the injury did not occur within admiralty jurisdiction, the action will be governed by
state law.
5. See LHWCA, 33 U.S.C. § 901-905 (1983). Some maritime workers are neither
seamen nor covered by LHWCA. See infra notes 167-76 and accompanying text. Some
workers who may claim to be maritime are beyond the coverage of LHWCA and therefore
confined to state workers' compensation systems; others may be covered by both LHWCA
and state workers' compensation systems. The 1984 amendments to LHWCA, Pub. L.
No. 98-426, 1984 U.S. Cong. Cong. & Ad. News (98 Stat.) 1639 (1984) (to be codified
at 33 U.S.C. §§ 902(3), 903) [hereinafter cited as LHWCA Amendments], signed into law
on Sept. 28, 1984, change the coverage of LHWCA by eliminating certain workers
theretofore covered, provided such workers are covered by a State workers' compensation
system.
6. The 1972 amendments to LHWCA abolished the unseaworthiness action for
workers covered by LHWCA. 33 U.S.C. § 905(b) (1983). The negligence action left to
LHWCA employees against vessels by § 905(b) has been limited by the infusion of some
common-law duty limits. See generally Scindia Steam Nay. Co. v. De Los Santos, 451
U.S. 156, 101 S. Ct. 164 (1981). Typically a LHWCA worker is employed by an independent
contractor who contracts with the vessel owner for cargo-handling, repair or other services.
In the atypical situation in which a longshoreman is directly employed by the vessel, 33
U.S.C. § 905(b) provides for a negligence action against the vessel owner, provided the
negligence is in the defendant's capacity as vessel owner, and not in its capacity as
employer of other workers engaged in the same kinds of duties as plaintiff. See Jones
& Laughlin Steel Co. v. Pfeifer, 103 S. Ct. 2541 (1983). The 1984 amendments to LHWCA
retain the directly-employed longshoreman's right to a tort action against the vessel or
employer, but eliminate that right for employees of shipyards. LHWCA Amendments, supra
note 5, at 1640 (to be codified at 33 U.S.C. § 905(b)).
7. See supra note 4. Because the lower courts read Executive Jet to require both
locality and a significant relationship to traditional maritime activity, actions by nonseaman maritime workers against shipowners and other tortfeasors will sometimes fall
under state law, even though the injured worker's rights against the employer are covered
by LHWCA. See, e.g., Parker v. South Louisiana Contractors, Inc., 537 F.2d 113 (5th
Cir. 1976). There is a strong argument that the lower courts are in error in insisting on
locality in all non-seamen's cases not governed by the Admiralty Extension Act, 46 U.S.C.
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and the courts have struggled with the task of defining seamen for at
least sixty years. A recent article in another journal indicates that the
result of that struggle has been chaos.' The present article concedes that
the various tests or formulae used by the courts for determining seaman
status lack full consistency, but argues that acceptable criteria for making
the status determination can be gleaned from the jurisprudence.
The Supreme Court's Contribution
The Jones Act 9 provides for a very liberal form of negligence action
against the employer of "any seaman" hurt in the course of his employment but does not define the term "seaman." The decisions working
out the definition of that term have generally involved access to the
Jones Act, but the same criteria also govern the injured worker's access
to the maintenance and cure remedy.'" The unseaworthiness remedy has
a different history."
For several years after the Jones Act was passed, the Supreme Court
used a very inclusive concept of seaman status, holding that the Act
covered longshoremen hurt while loading or unloading vessels on navigable water.' 2 But the enactment of the 1927 Longshoremen's and
Harbor Workers' Compensation Act (LWHCA) 3 caused a change of
course. The LHWCA set up a workers' compensation system that ex' 4
cluded from its coverage "a master or member of a crew of any vessel."'
For a time the Court wavered as to whether there was overlap between
the two statutes-i.e., as to whether there existed a category of workers
who were both Jones Act "seamen" and not excluded from LHWCA
by the "member of a crew" language'-but eventually decided in Swan-

§ 640 (1983). See, e.g., Robertson, Injuries to Marine Petroleum Workers: A Plea for
Radical Simplification, 55 Tex. L. Rev. 973, 1009-10 (1977); Robertson, Book Review,
1976 Wis. L. Rev. 352, 364.
8. See Engerrand & Bale, Seaman Status Reconsidered, 24 S. Tex. L.J. 431, 451,
494 (1983).
9. 46 U.S.C. § 688 (1983).
10. See, e.g., Hall v. Diamond M Co., 732 F.2d 1246, 1248 (5th Cir. 1984).
11. See infra text accompanying notes 160-204.
12. The major case was International Stevedoring Co. v. Haverty, 272 U.S. 50, 47
S. Ct. 19 (1926). Cases following Haverty include Jamison v. Encarnacion, 281 U.S. 635,
638-39, 50 S. Ct. 441, 441-42 (1930); Uravic v. Jarka Co., 282 U.S. 234, 238, 51 S. Ct.
111, 112 (1931). Cf. Puget Sound Stevedoring Co., v. Tax Comm'n, 302 U.S. 90, 9293, 58 S. Ct. 72,73 (1937); Northern Coal & Dock Co. v. Strand, 278 U.S. 142, 146-47
49 S. Ct. 88. 89-90 (1928).
13. 33 U.S.C. § 901 et seq. (1983).
14. 33 U.S.C. §§ 902(3), 903(a)(1) (1983).
15. See the conflicting expressions on that point within each of the following opinions:
Norton v. Warner Co., 321 U.S. 565, 569 n.3, 572 n.5, 573, 321 S. Ct. 747, 750 n.3,
751 n.5 (1943); South Chicago Coal & Dock Co. v. Bassett, 309 U.S. 251, 256-57, 259-
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son v. Marra Brothers, Inc.16 that the statutes are mutually exclusive. 7
The logic of this decision is that a worker is a Jones Act seaman if
and only if he is a "master or member of a crew of any vessel" and
that the same criteria govern the status issue whether the worker is
seeking Jones Act coverage or LHWCA coverage. 8
There are only seven Supreme Court decisions that bear in any
useful way on the criteria for determining when a worker is a "member
of a crew of any vessel."' 9 Two were decided before Swanson v. Marra
Brothers had established the mutual exclusivety of the Jones Act and
LHWCA. South Chicago Coal & Dock Co. v. Bassett20 held that a
worker, regularly assigned to cargo-handling duties aboard a lighter used
for fueling steamboats on a navigable river, was not excluded from
LHWCA coverage as a crew member, reasoning that crew members are
"those employees on the vessel who are naturally and primarily on board
to aid in her navigation."'" The Court stressed a policy of deference
to the trier-of-fact's findings on issues of crew member status, 22 and
expressly indicated that it was concerned with LHWCA coverage, not
Jones Act coverage. 23 Norton v. Warner Co.,24 also involving a worker
seeking LHWCA coverage, held that a general handyman who lived and
worked on a barge, performing work connected with its maintenance
and movement, and who had no cargo-handling or shore-side duties,
was excluded from LHWCA coverage because workers who "aid in
navigation .. .at all times contribute to the labors about the operation
and welfare of the ship when she is upon a voyage." '25 The Court
stressed the worker's permanent attachment to the barge 6 and indicated
its belief that a worker such as plaintiff should seek recovery under the
27
Jones Act.

60, 60 S. Ct. 544, 547-48, 548-49 (1940); Warner v. Goltra, 193 U.S. 155, 156-57, 15758, 159-60, 162, 55 S. Ct. 46, 47-48, 48, 49 (1934); Nogueira v. New York, N.H. &
N.R. Co., 281 U.S. 128, 132, 134, 135-36, 50 S. Ct. 303, 304, 305 (1930).
16. 328 U.S. 1, 66 S. Ct. 869 (1946).
17. The theoretical mutual exclusivity of the Jones Act and LHWCA had not meant
full mutual exclusivity in practice. See infra text accompanying notes 125-51.
18. But see infra text accompanying notes 125-51.
19. Once Warner v. Goltra, 293 U.S. 155, 55 S. Ct. 46 (1934), had established that
masters are covered by the Jones Act, master status has not presented problems.
20. 309 U.S. 251, 60 S. Ct. 544 (1940).
21. Id. at 260, 60 S. Ct. at 544.
22. Id. at 257-58, 60 S. Ct. at 548.
23. Id. at 259-60, 60 S. Ct. at 549. But see Engerrand & Bale, supra note 8, at 450,
stating that Bassett meant the injured worker "was excluded from the Jones Act."
24. 321 U.S. 565, 64 S. Ct. 747 (1943).
25. Id.at 572, 64 S. Ct. at 751.
26. Id.at 573, 64 S. Ct. at 751.
27. Id.
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The remaining Supreme Court decisions involved workers seeking
Jones Act coverage. 28 Desper v. Starved Rock Ferry Co. 29 denied seaman
status to a worker engaged in readying a fleet of small sightseeing

motorboats for the upcoming summer season. While the plaintiff" was
scheduled to operate a boat during the season, 3' the boats were not yet

in the water;32 the work the plaintiff was doing when he was injured
was seasonal repair (of the sort traditionally done for larger vessels by
shorebased personnel) and the vessels were out of navigation, i.e., "laid

up for the winter." 33
Both Bassett and Desper stressed that questions of seaman status
are almost always for the trier of fact. 3 4 All three of the foregoing
decisions were attempts to delimit a narrow category of cases in which

the tribunal of first instance should decide the status issue as a matter
of law. The criteria for making that determination that emerge from
Bassett, Norton, and Desper can be summarized as follows: A worker

is a member of a crew of a vessel if he has a permanent attachment"
to a vessel in navigation3 6 and his work contributes to the operation

28. These cases were decided after Swanson v. Marra Brothers had established the
mutual exclusivity of the Jones Act and LHWCA. Hence, they are authoritative on the
"member of a crew" exclusion from LHWCA coverage, as well as on Jones Act coverage.
29. 342 U.S. 187, 72 S. Ct. 216 (1952).
30. The actual plaintiff was the personal representative, seeking wrongful death recovery.
31. The plaintiff had also operated a boat during the previous summer season, but
his employment was terminated after that, and he was rehired in the early spring of the
year in question. The Court indicated that had the worker been hurt in the course of
operating a boat, he would have been covered by the Jones Act. 342 U.S. at 190-91, 72
S. Ct. at 218.
32. The Court stated that the Jones Act "does not cover probable or expectant
seamen but seamen in being." Id. at 191, 72 S. Ct. at 218.
33. Id. at 191, 72 S. Ct. at 218. The "vessel in navigation" criterion, derived in
large part from Desper, has been construed in a number of subsequent decisions. See.,
e.g., Roper v. United States, 368 U.S. 20, 82 S. Ct. 5 (1961); Butler v. Whiteman, 356
U.S. 271, 78 S. Ct. 734 (1958), discussed infta text accompanying note 45; McDermott,
Inc. v. Boudreaux, 679 F.2d 452, 455-56 (5th Cir. 1982), discussed at notes 110-11; Abshire
v. Seacoast Products, Inc., 668 F.2d 832 (5th Cir. 1982); Wixom v. Boland Marine &
Mfg. Co., 614 F.2d 956 (5th Cir. 1980). A vessel remains in navigation even though it
is stationary for a lengthy period, drilling for oil, supporting a crane, engaging in
construction activities and the like. It is not out of navigation while working. See generally
Johnson v. Beasley Constr. Co., 742 F.2d 1054 (7th Cir. 1984). A vessel is taken out of
navigation only when removed from service for extensive repairs or reconstruction. The
"out of navigation" question is one of fact, turning largely on the extent of the repair
operations and who controls those operations. See Abshire, 668 F.2d at 836.
34. Bassett, 309 U.S. at 257-59, 60 S. Ct. at 547-48; Desper, 342 U.S. at 190, 72
S. Ct. at 218.
35. Norton, 321 U.S. at 573, 64 S. Ct. at 751.
36. Desper, 342 U.S. at 191, 72 S. Ct. at 218.
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and welfare of the vessel when it is on a voyage.17
The subsequent Supreme Court decisions expanded those criteria.
Senko v. LaCrosse Dredging Corp.38 held that a worker who was permanently assigned to a dredge that had never moved during his entire
period of employment, and that moved quite infrequently, was entitled
to reach the jury on the seaman status issue, stressing that status issues
are almost always questions of fact,3 9 that the worker performed general
maintenance on the dredge while it was stationary, and that he would
have navigational duties if and when the dredge moved. 40 The Senko
decision plainly means that a worker need not be aboard "naturally
and primarily in aid of navigation" in order to be a seaman, unless
the term "navigation" is to be translated into "maintenance during an
indefinitely extended anchorage." It also shows that a vessel can be
immobile for a lengthy period and still be "in navigation," so long as
it is working. Most importantly, it expresses great deference for the
4
jury's role in determining seaman status.
The remaining Supreme Court decisions were per curiam reversals
of Court of Appeals denials of seaman status, containing no meaningful
explanation of the results. Gianfala v. Texas Co.42 established that a
member of a drilling crew aboard a submersible barge could be classified
as a seaman by a jury though the barge was submerged and firmly
secured to the bottom when the injury occurred, ordinarily moved about
once a year, and the plaintiff had no duties in connection with its
movement.4 3 Grimes v. Raymond Concrete Piling Co.4 4 conferred the
right to reach the jury on the status issue upon a worker whose principal
assignment was to an offshore radar installation, permanently attached
to the ocean's floor; the worker was injured at the conclusion of a six4
hour stint aboard a nearby construction barge. Butler v. Whiteman 1
held that a worker, assigned.to assist in the rehabilitation of a tug that
had been laid up at anchorage for at least ten months, could be a

37. Norton, 321 U.S. at 572, 64 S. Ct. at 751.
38. 352 U.S. 370, 77 S. Ct. 415 (1957).
39. Id. at 373-74, 77 S. Ct. at 417.
40. Id. at 374, 77 S. Ct. at 417-18. The Senko opinion ignores the Desper Court's
statement that the Jones Act does not cover prospective seamen. See supra note 32.
41. The Senko opinion states that "juries have the same discretion [in determining
seaman status) they have in finding negligence or any other fact, The essence of this
discretion is that a jury's decision is final if it has a reasonable basis, whether or not
the appellate court agrees with the jury's estimate." 352 U.S. at 374, 77 S. Ct. at 417.
42. 350 U.S. 879, 76 S. Ct. 141 (1955).
43. The facts are set forth in the Court of Appeals decision, Texas Co. v. Gianfala,
222 F.2d 382 (5th Cir. 1955).
44. 356 U.S. 252, 78 S. Ct. 687 (1958).
45. 356 U.S. 271, 78 S. Ct. 734 (1958).
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seaman if the jury found that the tug was in navigation and plaintiff
was a member of its crew.
When the results of the per curiam decisions are added to the BassetNorton-Desper-Senko series, it appears that the Supreme Court's seaman
status approach emphasizes that it is proper to submit the issue to the
jury in almost all cases, and that a worker should not be excluded from
such status as a matter of law if he had a permanent connection with
or performed a significant amount of work aboard a vessel in navigation
and his duties contributed to the vessel's operation, maintenance, or
mission. The Court's decisions also show that special-purpose structures
not usually thought of as vessels but designed to float and move from
time to time on navigable water are Jones Act vessels, and that a vessel
can still be "in navigation" although inoperable for a lengthy period
undergoing major rehabilitation.
Emergence of the Robison Test
The Supreme Court issued no further guidance after the 1958 Butler
decision, 46 and the task of working out a full set of criteria for determining seaman status has been left to the lower courts. A substantial
majority of the cases have arisen in the courts of the Fifth Circuit
because of the developed offshore oil and gas industry. A consistent
theme in all of the circuits has been emphasis that status issues are
usually questions for the trier of fact. For a time the Fifth and most
of the other circuits worked with a test for seaman status that stated
a worker is a seaman if he has a more or less permanent connection
with a vessel in navigation and was aboard primarily in aid of navigation.4 7 But that test was not an accurate synthesis of the Supreme
Court decisions unless "aboard in aid of navigation" was translated
into "aboard in aid of the vessel's welfare, mission, or function, ' 48 and
the "more or less permanent connection" element had to be read with
corresponding liberality.
Accordingly, the Fifth Circuit's notable decision in Offshore Co. v.
Robison49 articulated a different test, one more in keeping with the
Supreme Court decisions and the relevant lower court jurisprudence.
Stressing that no bright-line definition of seamen was possible, 0 that

46. Id.
47. See generally Johnson v. Beasley Constr. Co., 742 F.2d 1054 (7th Cir. 1984);
McKie v. Diamond Marine Co., 204 F.2d 132, 136 (5th Cir. 1953); Wilkes v. Mississippi
River Sand & Gravel Co., 202 F.2d 383, 388 (6th Cir. 1953).
48. See, e.g., Wilkes, 202 F.2d at 388.
49. 266 F.2d 769 (5th Cir. 1959).
50. "Attempts to fix unvarying meanings have [sic] a firm legal significance to such
terms as 'seaman', 'vessel', 'member of a crew' must come to grief on the facts. These
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status issues are almost always for the jury,5" that the meaning of the
term seaman should "develop naturally" as technology changes the
nature of maritime work,52 and that the policy touchstone is the worker's
exposure to marine risks,53 the Robison court stated that there is an

evidentiary basis for a Jones Act case to go to the jury on the status
issue:

(1) if there is evidence that the injured workman was assigned
permanently to a vessel (including special purpose structures not
usually employed as a means of transport by water but designed

to float on water) or performed a substantial part of his work
on the vessel; and
(2) if the capacity in which he was employed or the duties
which he performed contributed to the function of the vessel
or the accomplishment of its mission, or to the operation or

welfare of the vessel in terms of its maintenance during its
4
movement or during anchorage for its future trips.1
The foregoing statement quickly became the test for seaman status
determinations in the Fifth 5 and most of the other circuits.5 6 While the
Robison formulation was originally addressed to the question of the

sufficiency of the evidence on seaman status to reach the jury, (i.e., to
the evidence necessary to defeat defendant's motion for summary judgment or directed verdict), the recent cases indicate that Robison is also
an appropriate source of jury instructions on seaman status.5 7 Further-

terms have such a wide range of meaning, under the Jones Act as interpreted in the
courts, that, except in rare cases, only a jury or trier of fact can determine their application
in the circumstances of a particular case." Id. at 779-80 (footnotes omitted).
51. Even where the facts are largely undisputed, the question at issue is not solely a
question of law when, because of conflicting inferences that may lead to different
conclusions among reasonable men, a trial judge cannot state an unvarying rule
of law that fits the facts. The Jones Act cases involving coverage are similar in
this respect to many negligence and contributory negligence cases.
Id. at 780 (footnotes omitted).
52. Id.
53. "Many of the Jones Act seamen on these [offshore drilling] vessels share the
same marine risks to which all aboard are subject. And in many instances Jones Act
seaman are exposed to more hazards than are blue-water sailors." Id.
54. Id. at 779.
55. See, e.g., cases cited infra notes 59-60.
56. See Johnson v. Beasley Constr. Co., 742 F.2d 1054 No. 83-3196, slip op. (7th
Cir. Aug. 24, 1984); Olsen v. City of New York, No. 83-Civ.-0462, slip op. (S.D.N.Y.
Aug. 21, 1984).
57. See Bertrand v. International Mooring & Marine, Inc., 700 F.2d 240, 244 (5th
Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 974 (1984); McDermott, Inc. v. Boudreaux, 679 F.2d
452, 457 (5th Cir. 1982). Engerrand & Bale, supra note 8, at 470-71, states that the Fifth
Circuit cases have left it doubtful whether juries should be instructed in Robison terms,
as opposed to the earlier and more restrictive McKie formulation. It is difficult to agree
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more, a plaintiff may so clearly satisfy the Robison elements as to be
entitled to summary judgment or directed verdict that he is a seaman. 8
The Robison formulation has been quoted, interpreted, and discussed
in literally hundreds of cases, so that its treatment has come to resemble
that of an often-construed general statute.5 9 Courts ritualistically quote
Robison, ritualistically state that it is not an all-purpose formula but
merely an analytical starting point, 60 and then proceed to decide whether
6
the case at bar satisfies each of the Robison elements. As technology '
and the ingenuity of counsel for marine employers 62 have changed the
nature of marine work and the relationship between marine workers
and vessels, new cases with a strong appeal to classification of the
worker as a seaman have arisen, and the Robison criteria have been.
construed, explained, and expanded in order to accommodate those cases.
The result of this process, over time, has been the addition of a number
of "amendments" to Robison, such that a complete and accurate statement of the current meaning of the case would probably occupy several
pages of print. Recent decisions indicate that rather cumbersome structure
is becoming strained and that it may be time for the court to set aside
Robison-as-amended and start anew. A quarter of a century of technological and jurisprudential development has intervened since the Robison court so ably synthesized the jurisprudence, and the time may
have come for another such benchmark. The most dramatic demonstration of the strains to which the Robison formulation of seaman
status criteria is being subjected has occurred in the Fifth Circuit's
"fleet" cases.
The "Fleet" Cases
Robison stated the criteria for seaman status in terms of plaintiff's
connection with a single vessel. The "fleet" "amendment" to Robison
began in Braniff v. Jackson Ave.-Gretna Ferry, Inc., 63 in which the

that Bertrand and McDermott leave the matter in doubt; the indications are plain that
Robison is the proper formulation.
58. See, e.g., Colomb v. Texaco, 736 F.2d 218, 220-21 (5th Cir. 1984); Coulter v.
Texaco, 714 F.2d 467, 468-69 (5th Cir. 1983); Cf. McDermott, Inc. v. Boudreaux, 679
F.2d 452, 457-58 (5th Cir. 1982).
59. See, e.g., Bouvier v. Krenz, 702 F.2d 89, 90 (5th Cir. 1983), explaining three
"different" but "essentially equivalent" formulations of "the test for seaman status."
60. See, e.g., Roberts v. Williams-McWilliams Co., 648 F.2d 255, 260-61 (5th Cir.
1981); Guidry v, Continental Oil Co., 640 F.2d 523, 528-29 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 454
U.S. 818 (1981); Davis v. Hill Eng'g, Inc., 549 F.2d 314, 326-27 (5th Cir. 1977); Brown
v. ITT Rayonier, Inc., 497 F.2d 234, 237 (5th Cir. 1974).
61.
62.
63.

See, e.g., Robison, 266 F.2d at 780.
See, e.g., Bertrand, 700 F.2d at 245, 248.
280 F.2d 523 (5th Cir. 1960).
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deceased workers were responsible for maintenance and repair work on
several ferries operated by the employer in the Port of New Orleans.
Their work frequently took them aboard ferries afloat and in operation.
The court stated that nothing in Robison precluded seaman status by
virtue of the requisite attachment to "several specified vessels." 6' Subsequent decisions used Braniff as the basis for extending seamen's protections to: a company pilot assigned to two tugs; 65 a worker assigned
to several submersible offshore rigs;66 a roustabout who spent 70 percent
of her time on one or another of about half a dozen work barges; 67 a
shore-based handyman who spent 80-90 percent of his time doing general
68
maintenance and clerical work on one or the other of six towboats;
a structural welder who performed periodic work aboard and on those
occasions ate and slept aboard one of half a dozen derrick barges; 69 a
shore-based mechanic, assigned to a fleet of 21 menhaden fishing vessels; 70 a worker who serviced fixed platforms using several 16-20 foot
"Jo-Boats", and who spent 90 percent of his work time piloting or doing
maintenance work on the boats; 7 ' and a pipeline welder, assigned to
the employer's fleet of offshore pipeline barges, killed while engaged in
extensive repairs of one of the barges moored in a slip at the employer's
72
yard.
In all of these cases the plaintiff showed some kind of assignment
to a "specified" or identifiable group of vessels. Seaman status was
denied to workers who could not characterize the facts as involving an
"identifiable group of vessels." 73 Insistence that there be an "identifiable
fleet" kept traditional longshoremen and other harbor workers (who
may spend all day every day aboard vessels but who have no connection
with an identifiable fleet) from being classified as seamen, and thus
74
maintained a line of demarcation between the Jones Act and LHWCA.
Some commentators have contended that the recent decision in Bertrand v. International Mooring & Marine, Inc.," obliterated that line
64. Id. at 528.
65. Magnolia Towing Co. v. Pace, 378 F.2d 12 (5th Cir. 1967) (jury question).
66. Higginbotham v. Mobil Oil Corp., 545 F.2d 422, 432-33 (5th Cir. 1977) (seaman
as matter of law), rev'd on other grounds, 436 U.S. 618 (1978).
67. Landry v. Amoco Prod. Co., 595 F.2d 1070 (5th Cir. 1979) (seaman as matter
of law).
68. Bazile v. Bisso Marine Co., 606 F.2d 101 (5th Cir. 1979) (jury question), cert.
denied, 449 U.S. 829, 101 S. Ct. 94 (1980).
69. Ardoin v. J. Ray McDermott & Co., 641 F.2d 277 (5th Cir. 1981) (jury question).
70. Abshire v. Seacoast Prods., Inc., 668 F.2d 832 (5th Cir. 1982) (jury question).
71. Mungia v. Chevron Co., U.S.A., 675 F.2d 630 (5th Cir. 1982) (jury question).
72. McDermott, Inc. v. Boudreaux, 679 F.2d 452 (5th Cir. 1982) (seaman as matter
of law).
73. See, e.g., Guidry, 640 F.2d at 529.
74. See, e.g., Burns v. Anchor-Wate Co., 469 F.2d 730, 733 (5th Cir. 1972).
75. 700 F.2d 240 (5th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 974 (1984).
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of demarcation. 76 That characterization is erroneous, 77 but Bertrand does
call for a new way of drawing the line.
The Bertrand plaintiffs 78 were members of an anchorhandling crew
who spent virtually all of their time at sea aboard vessels, performing
actual navigational work. They were specialists in handling the heavy
anchors and otherwise assisting in the relocation of offshore drilling
barges and performed all of that work aboard specially-equipped workboats. 79 But these workboats did not constitute an identifiable fleet,
because the employer neither owned nor chartered them; instead, a
suitable workboat would be furnished for the particular job by the
owner of the drilling barge being moved. Plaintiffs thus went to sea
frequently, aboard a wide variety of workboats, always remaining with
the workboat until the rig-moving job was completed. These rig-moving
jobs lasted from several hours to several days. 0 The district court
determined that "this anchor-handling crew was continuously subjected
to the perils of the sea like blue water seamen and was engaged in
classical seamen's work,"" but granted summary judgment that they
were not seamen, reasoning that there was no identifiable fleet. "[Olne
cannot be a member of a crew of numerous vessels which have no
common ownership or control." '8 2 Reversing, the Fifth Circuit Court of
Appeals held that the law does not require common ownership or control,
and that the number of vessels on which plaintiff works is just one of

76. See Engerrand & Bale, supra note 8, at 489-90.
77. See Buras v. Commercial Testing & Eng'g Co., 736 F.2d 307, 311 n.4 (5th Cir.
1984) (partially explaining the error).
78. Some of the plaintiffs were survivors of the crew members seeking wrongful death
damages and others were injured crew members. For convenience, the workers are referred
to in this discussion as plaintiffs.
79. The plaintiffs were hurt in an automobile accident returning in transportation
furnished by the employer from the dock where they had landed after completing a sevenday job aboard the Aquamarine 503, relocating a Tenneco drilling barge. The fact that
plaintiffs were hurt during land transportation did not weaken their claims to status as
Jones Act seamen hurt in the course of their employment. See Vincent v. Harvey Well
Service, 441 F.2d 146 (5th Cir. 1971).
80. The anchorhandling crew members who had done the seven-day job aboard
Aquamarine 503 (see note 79 supra) could probably have established seaman status on
the basis of their connection with that vessel, without reference to the fleet concept. See
Porche v. Gulf Mississippi Marine Corp., 390 F. Supp. 624, 631 (E.D. La. 1975). But
plaintiffs were determined to achieve seaman status as a group, and one of the plaintiffs
had not been to sea on the last job; he was a regular member of the anchorhandling
crew who had been on stand-by status during the last job and had been sent with the
van to return the other members to the main base. Hence, status by way of the connection
with Aquamirine 503 was not an available argument.
81. Bertrand v. International Mooring & Marine, Inc., 517 F. Supp. 342, 348 (W.D.
La. 1981).
82. Id. at 347.
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the many factors to consider in making the status determination. 3 The
factors that most influenced the court's conclusion that the plaintiffs
were entitled to reach the jury on seaman status were their continuous
exposure to the perils of the sea, "like blue water seamen," and their
"classical seamen's work." '8 4 The court also emphasized that it was the
employer's contractual arrangements, not the nature of plaintiffs' work,
that determined whether the vessels were under common ownership or
control.85
Bertrand is correct in its result, 6 but the change it made in the
Robison doctrine has caused problems for the court in subsequent cases.
The identifiable fleet requirement, which the district court in Bertrand
translated into "identifiable by common ownership or control, 8 7 had
been the principal basis for excluding traditional longshoremen and
similarly situated workers from Jones Act coverage. 8 Bertrand clearly
will not be taken to mean that such workers are now entitled to seaman
status; 9 several post-Bertrand decisions in which such workers have
asserted seaman status have resulted in summary judgment for the
defendant, just as they would have before the Bertrand "amendment"
to the Braniff "amendment" to Robison. 90 The commentators who
claimed that Bertrandobliterated the Jones/LHWCA line of demarcation
are wrong. 9' But the court has had to strain for reasons, stating that
Bertrand does not dispense with the "identifiable fleet" requirement,
except perhaps in cases in which the lack of an identifiable fleet is the
product of the employer's contractual arrangements rather than the
nature of the plaintiffs' work. 92 With the decision in Bertrand, an
additional doctrinal complexity, further burdening the already cumbersome Robison-as-amended structure, has been introduced.

83. 700 F.2d at 246.
84. Id.at 243, 245.
85. Id.at 245, 248.
86. I should acknowledge that I represented the Bertrand plaintiffs in the Fifth Circuit.
Several recent cases with facts virtually identical to Bertrand's have reached the same
result. See Hall v. Diamond M Co., 732 F.2d 1246 (5th Cir. 1984); Norman v. Aubrey
Burke & Assocs., 585 F. Supp. 494 (E.D. La. 1984). Cf. Smith v. Odom Offshore Surveys,
Inc., 588 F. Supp. 1168 (M.D. La. 1984).
87. 517 F. Supp. at 347.
88. See supra notes 73-74 and accompanying text.
89. See supra note 77.
90. See Buras v. Commercial Testing & Eng'g Co., 736 F.2d 307 (5th Cir. 1984);
White v. Valley Line Co., 736 F.2d 304 (5th Cir. 1984); Bouvier v. Krenz, 702 F.2d 89
(5th Cir. 1983). See also the following cases, to the same effect, decided shortly before
Bertrand: Jones v. Mississippi River Grain Elevator Co., 703 F.2d 108 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 104 S. Ct. 175 (1983); Fox v. Taylor Diving & Salvage Co., 694 F.2d 1349 (5th
Cir. 1983).
91. See supra note 77.
92. See Buras, 736 F.2d at 311-12; White, 736 F.2d at 307.
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The Wallace Case
It is possible to read Judge Brown's opinion in Wallace v. OceaneeringInternational3 as setting forth the ingredients of a new approach
to seaman status issues. The plaintiff was a deep-sea diver, seriously
hurt during a dive in 155 feet deep waters. The facts presented several
bases on which seaman status could have been sustained under traditional
Robison-as-amended reasoning, 94 but the court chose another approach:
[T]he total circumstances of an individual's employment must
be weighed to determine whether he had sufficient relation to
the navigation of vessels and the perils attendant thereon....
[I]n ambiguous cases, our analysis again and again has focused
on (1) the degree of exposure to the hazards or perils of the
sea, and (2) the maritime or terra firma nature of the worker's
duties ....
[T]he seaman status of Wallace is established by his
exposure to maritime perils with regularity and continuity, and
the maritime nature of his primary duties ....
We hold that a
commercial diver, who embodies the traditional and inevitably
maritime task of navigation, has the legal protections of a
seaman when a substantial part of his duties are performed on
vessels. It is the inherently maritime nature of the tasks performed and perils faced by his profession, and not the fortuity
of his tenure on the vessel from which he makes the particular
dive on which he was injured, that makes Wallace a seaman. 9"
Wallace does not proclaim that it is announcing a new set of criteria
for seaman status determinations, but the ingredients are plainly present.
As a substitute for the basic Robison formulation, this statement can
be extrapolated from Wallace: A worker shows an evidentiary basis to
reach the jury on the issue of his status as a seaman if there is evidence
(1) that a substantial part of his duties are performed on vessels, and
(2) that his work regularly or significantly exposes him to the dangers
of the sea or to dangers associated with the movement of vessels.

93. 727 F.2d 427 (5th Cir. 1984).
94. (1) For more than nine years immediately prior to the job on which he was hurt
the plaintiff had been permanently assigned to three vessels controlled by his employer.
Id. at 430. Seaman status on that basis alone could have been sustained under Higginbotham, 545 F.2d at 432-33 (seaman as matter of law). (2) Respecting the diving.job on
which he was hurt, the plaintiff was assigned to a particular vessel for an indefinite time.
727 F.2d at 430. Seaman status on that basis alone could have been sustained under
Roberts, 648 F.2d at 262 (seaman as matter of law). (3) The plaintiff had taken his
present employment on the promise that he would be permanently assigned to a particular
vessel owned by the employer as soon as it returned to the Gulf. 727 F.2d at 430. See
the Supreme Court's Senko decision, 352 U.S. at 370, 77 S. Ct. at 416. See also Porche,
390 F. Supp. at 631.
95. 727 F.2d at 432-36.
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At this writing the courts continue to operate under the Robisonas-amended approach. The following survey of the significant recent
status decisions will briefly indicate how the suggested Wallace criteria
might have simplified or otherwise improved the status inquiry.
Cases Turning on Whether Particular Structures Are Vessels
Several recent cases have refused to classify seaplanes, helicopters
with pontoons, and other aircraft as Jones Act vessels despite plaintiffs'
arguments that these aircraft are doing work formerly done by vessels
and that their crews are subjected' to many of the perils of the sea. 96
Four members of the court have indicated their disagreement with the
court's exclusion of aircraft. 97 To the extent that, as compared with
Robison, the proposed Wallace approach deemphasizes plaintiff's connection with vessels and stresses the degree of exposure to marine dangers, Wallace might suggest a different inquiry in these cases.
The court continues to classify fixed platforms as non-vessels; fixed
platform workers are subject to summary judgment that they are not
seamen. Most of these cases would clearly turn out the same way under
Wallace as under the traditional Robison approach. For example, the
plaintiff in Prinzi v. Keydril Co. 9 lived and worked on the drilling rig
for three weeks while it was positioned aboard two barges in a shipyard,
awaiting placement on a new platform. Upholding summary judgment
that the worker was not a seaman, the court cited the fixed platform
rule and stated that the plaintiff's connection with the barges was
"tangential." 99 Under the Wallace approach, summary judgment would
have been explained on the basis that the plaintiff did not perform a
substantial part of his work on vessels.
Some platform workers may show a sufficient connection with a
vessel used in connection with the platform operations to qualify under
Robison. For example, the plaintiff in Parks v. Dowell Division of Dow
Chemical Co.'00 was a seaman because he had his office and performed
most of his duties aboard a drilling tender anchored adjacent to the

96. See Hebert v. Air Logistics, Inc., 720 F.2d 853, 856 (5th Cir. 1983); Reeves v.
Offshore Logistics, Inc., 720 F.2d 835, 836-37 (5th Cir. 1983); Barger v. Petro. Helicopters,
Inc., 692 F.2d 337, 339 (5th Cir. 1982) cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 2430 (1983); Ward v.
Department of Labor, Office of Workers' Compensation Programs, 684 F.2d 1114, 1118
(5th Cir. 1982), cert. denied sub nom. Zapata-Haynie Corp. v. Ward, 103 S. Ct. 815
(1983); Smith v. Pan Air Corp., 684 F.2d 1102, 1113-14 (5th Cir. 1982).
97. See Barger, 692 F.2d at 345 (Brown, Johnson, Politz, & Tate, JJ., dissenting
from denial of rehearing en banc).
98. 738 F.2d 707 (5th Cir. 1984). See also Poole v. Marlin Drilling Co., 592 F. Supp.
60 (W.D. La. 1984).
99. 738 F.2d at 710.
100. 712 F.2d 154 (5th Cir. 1983).
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platform. The Wallace approach would probably have reached the same
outcome, focusing on the plaintiff's work aboard "vessels" and his
exposure to the dangers of the sea.
Submersible and other floatable drilling rigs are clearly vessels. Colomb v. Texaco, Inc., 10 upheld summary judgment for a worker permanently attached to an inland submersible spud drilling barge, holding
that such a structure is a vessel as a matter of law. Wallace would
necessitate an additional inquiry in a case like Colomb, addressed to
the nature of the hazards to which workers on such inland rigs are
exposed.
Aside from the aircraft cases, the only significantly difficult "vessel"
issue recently addressed by the court involved a pile-driving barge built
to carry a 150-ton crane. Reversing summary judgment for defendant,
the court held that a jury could find the barge to be a vessel in light
of its design and purpose.10 2 "The barge by necessity is designed to
transport a pile-driving crane across navigable waters to jobsites that
cannot be reached by land-based pile drivers."'0 3 Wallace, like Robison,
would result in submission of this case to the jury, but with the additional
inquiry into the nature and extent of the hazards confronted by plaintiff
in the course of his regular work. 1c4
Other Recent Status Cases
Five recent Fifth Circuit decisions upheld summary judgment against
shore-based workers who serviced a large number of vessels on a daily
basis in their capacity as longshoremen, repairmen, or maintenance
workers. 05 All of these cases used the first prong of Robison-the
requirement of a more or less permanent connection with or substantial

101. 736 F.2d 218 (5th Cir. 1984).
102. Brunet v. Bob Bros. Constr. Co., 715 F.2d 196 (5th Cir. 1983). This case reviews
the recent "vessel" cases, as does Judge Brown's dissent in Barger, 692 F.2d at 342-46.
See also Fox, 694 F.2d at 1354 (holding that a device known as a SPAR (submarine pipe
alignment rig) is "a tool, not. . . a vessel," and stating that the test for "vessel" status
is that the structure must be designed for navigation and commerce or in such use at
the time of the injury).
103. 715 F.2d at 198.
104. See McSweeney v. M.J. Rudolph Corp., 575 F. Supp. 746 (E.D.N.Y. 1983)
(reaching the opposite conclusion from Brunet, on very similar facts). The McSweeney
court noted that the plaintiff had no duties on the barge while it was in motion and
stated that it "ceased to be a 'barge' in the true sense of the word" when stationary.
Id. at 749.
105. Buras v. Commercial Testing & Eng'g Co., 736 F.2d 307 (5th Cir. 1984); White
v. Valley Line Co., 736 F.2d 304 (5th Cir. 1984); Jones v. Mississippi River Grain Elevator
Co., 703 F.2d 108 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 175 (1983); Bouvier v. Krenz, 702
F.2d 89 (5th Cir. 1983); Fox v. Taylor Diving & Salvage Co., 694 F.2d 1349 (5th Cir.
1983).
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work aboard a vessel or an identifiable fleet-as a principal basis for
denial of seaman status. In order to use that reasoning after Bertrand
the opinions had to insist that Bertrand does not dispense with the
requirement of an identifiable fleet. 0 6 Wallace would have offered a
better explanation for summary judgment in that none of these workers
regularly or significantly confronted the perils of the sea or dangers
associated with vessel movement in the course of their normal duties.
The plaintiff in Fredieu v. Rowan Companies, Inc.'0 7 went to work
for the defendant while the jack-up rig to which he was assigned was
still under construction. Judgment for the defendant was upheld on the
view that the rig was not yet a vessel in navigation. Wallace reasoning
would probably have reached the same result. The rig was partly built
at Vicksburg and then towed down-river to Belle Chasse for completion
of construction. The plaintiff joined it at Belle Chasse; it did not move
during his period of employment; and his duties consisted of loading
and unloading materials from barges tied to the rig in its floating position
on the river. Thus, the plaintiff was probably not regularly or significantly exposed to the dangers of the sea or to dangers associated with
the movement of vessels. However, had the plaintiff moved with the
rig downriver, or otherwise been significantly subjected to dangers associated with vessel movement, the case might have turned out differently
under Wallace. By shifting the emphasis away from connection with
vessels to exposure to dangers, Wallace makes it more difficult to deny
seaman status solely on the basis that a vessel afloat and under construction is technically not yet a vessel. 08
Wallace would sometimes mean workers currently classified as seamen as a matter of law would be subjected to a jury's determination
of their status. In Coulter v. Texaco, Inc., 0 9 the court upheld summary
judgment of seaman status for a roustabout whose work at a watersurrounded oil field in the Louisiana marshland necessitated daily contact
with two work boats. The court found that one of the two boats always
transported plaintiff to the work site, and that some of his daily work
was often performed on the deck of the vessels. These facts supported

106. Buras, 736 F.2d at 311; White, 736 F.2d at 307.
107. 738 F.2d 651 (5th Cir. 1984).
108. For other cases in which Wallace reasoning might yield a different inquiry than
Robison, see the following decisions in which workers who were seamen by virtue of
their connection 'with Vessel "A" were held to be "passengers" or "longshoremen"
respecting their connection with Vessel "B" and hence precluded from suing Vessel "B"
on the basis of unseaworthiness. Dove v. Belcher Oil Co., 686 F.2d 329 (5th Cir. 1982);
Burks v. Am. River Transp. Co., 679 F.2d 69 (5th Cir. 1982); Roberts v. WilliamsMcWilliams Co., 648 F.2d 255 (5th Cir. 1981); Garrett v. United States Lines, 574 F.2d
997 (9th Cir. 1978).
109. 714 F.2d 467 (5th Cir. 1983).
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a Robison connection with this small "fleet," which ended the court's
analysis. Judge Williams, dissenting, insisted that the status issue was
for the jury. The Wallace approach would support that view: while
there seemed no dispute that plaintiff performed a substantial part of
his work on vessels, whether his work regularly or significantly exposed
him to the hazards of the sea or to dangers associated with the movement
of vessels would seem to have been an issue of fact.
McDermott, Inc. v. Boudreaux"° seems to have been wrongly decided
under Robison, and it is not clear that application of the Wallace
approach would have prevented the error. The plaintiff worked for nine
or ten years as a welder assigned to the defendant's fleet of offshore
pipe-lay barges. At the time of his injury he had been working for three
months in extensive repairs to one of those barges-a barge to which
he had never been assigned-in a shipyard. Concluding that his regular
work with the barge fleet showed a Robison connection with the vessels
and that temporary shoreside work does not defeat seaman status, the
court reversed the Benefits Review Board's determination that the worker
was entitled to LHWCA benefits and characterized him as a seaman as
a matter of law. Judge Garwood, dissenting, argued that the case should
be remanded for fact-findings by the administrative law judge. Whether
the Wallace approach would have led to a different outcome in McDermott
is debatable. While Wallace would have focused on whether plaintiff's
work on vessels regularly or significantly exposed him to the dangers
of the sea or to dangers associated with the movement of vesselswhereas Robison focused on whether plaintiff's connection with the
vessels contributed to their function or mission-the controlling issue in
McDermott was whether the extensive shore-side assignment should have
entitled the plaintiff to the LHWCA coverage he sought. "' To the extent
that Wallace is more forthrightly policy-oriented than Robison, it might
have suggested a different outcome.
The foregoing discussion suggests that Wallace explains the "clear"
cases as well or better than Robison-as-amended."2 In certain more
debatable cases, Wallace suggests different inquiries from Robison. In
some cases in which Robison raises jury issues, Wallace might support
summary judgment for the defendant and occasionally for plaintiff on
the status issue." 3 On the other hand, the Wallace approach seems to
raise jury issues in certain recent cases in which Robison was used to

110. 679 F.2d 452 (5th Cir. 1982).
Ill. Cf. Smith v. Odom Offshore Surveys, Inc., 588 F. Supp. 1168 (M.D. La. 1984).
112. The "clear" cases include Bertrand, the fixed-platform cases, see supra notes 98100 and accompanying text, and the line of "basic harbor worker" cases, see supra notes
105-06 and accompanying text.
113. See, e.g., Bertrand, 700 F.2d at 240.
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support summary judgment for the defendant" 4 or the plaintiff." 5 In
any particular case in which Robison supports, and Wallace precludes,
summary judgment or directed verdict, Wallace is of course more expensive to operate. But over the long haul, Wallace generates more
predictability and clarity in the seaman status jurisprudence than Robison, the gains of shifting from the Robison-as-amended approach to
the simpler Wallace approach will outweigh the losses." 6 And there is
independent merit in an articulation that emphasizes the underlying
reasons for the seamen's protections and the policy of submitting debatable claims to those protections to the trier of fact.
Jury Instructions
As indicated above, the Robison formulation was originally addressed
to the question of the sufficiency of evidence of seaman status necessary
to enable the plaintiff to survive the defendant's motion for summary
judgment or directed verdict. The current cases hold that the Robison
language also delimits the fact-finder's role, indicating it is an appropriate
source of jury instructions on seaman status." 7 Whether a jury could
sensibly be instructed in Wallace terms should now be considered.
It seems clear that judges, whether judicial or administrative, should
be able to work with Wallace. When an injured worker seeks LHWCA
benefits the administrative law judge will inevitably decide the seaman
status issue," 8 which may be appealed to the Benefits Review Board"19
and then to the court of appeals.' 20 When the worker seeks Jones Act
coverage, the trial judge in a bench trial will decide the status issue,
which may be appealed to the court of appeals. In a Jones Act jury
trial the trial judge will decide whether to submit the status issue to
the jury, which determination may be appealed. Respecting all of the

114. See, e.g., Hebert, 720 F.2d at 853.
115. See, e.g., Colomb, 736 F.2d at 219; Coulter, 714 F.2d at 467.
116. If it is clear that the plaintiff performed a substantial part of his work on vessels
and in his normal work was regularly or significantly exposed to the dangers of the sea
or to dangers associated with the movement of vessels, Wallace will facilitate settlement
or stipulation on the status issue. If it is clear that the worker, (e.g., a "typical" shorebased service worker) cannot meet the second element of Wallace, conscientious counsel
for the worker can pursue his LHWCA rights without being forced to deal with the range
of problems involved in trying to protect the worker's rights under both systems. See
generally infra text accompanying notes 125-51.
117. See supra notes 56-58 and accompanying text.
118. 33 U.S.C. § 919(d) (1983) makes the administrative law judge the tribunal of
first instance. Sections 902(3) and 903(a) make the "member of a crew of any vessel"
inquiry a necessary ingredient in every coverage determination.
119. See 33 U.S.C. § 921(b) (1983).
120. See 33 U.S.C. § 921(c) (1983).
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foregoing "judicial" determinations, Wallace seems to offer more real
guidance than Robison-as-amended, because Wallace steers closer to the
policy that underlies the special protections for seamen.
Whether juries should be instructed in Wallace terms is only somewhat more debatable. The Robison decision itself explained that seaman
status is almost always a jury question, even when the facts are not in
dispute, "because of conflicting inferences that may lead to different
conclusions among reasonable men."' 2 It makes sense for the jury's
"inferences" and "conclusions" to be made with reference to the policy
of the seamen's protections, i.e., the nature and extent of the worker's
exposure to the dangers of the sea or to dangers associated with the
movement of vessels. Whether a plaintiff's work regularly or significantly
exposed him to such dangers is the kind of issue with which juries are
typically entrusted. Both Robison2 2 and Senko 2 1 analogized the jury's
role in finding seaman status to its role in finding negligence. This
comparison indicated great scope for jury responsiveness to the total
circumstances of the particular case. A typical negligence instruction is
considerably more general and open-ended than the suggested Wallace
instruction on seaman status. 2 4 Therefore, the trial judge should not
only apply the Wallace criteria to decide whether to submit the status
issue to the jury. Having decided to submit it, he would charge the
jury that they should find that the plaintiff was a seaman after determining that a substantial part of his duties were performed on vessels,
and that his work regularly or significantly exposed him to the dangers
of the sea or to dangers associated with the movement of vessels.
THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE JONES ACT AND LHWCA:
ELECTION OF REMEDIES, COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL, RES JUDICATA

Swanson v. Marra Brothers, Inc.' 25 established that the injury-protection regimes of the Jones Act and LHWCA are intended to be
mutually exclusive in their spheres of coverage. The logic of this holding
is that the Jones Act term "any seaman" is equivalent to the LHWCA

121. 266 F.2d at 780.
122. Id.
123. 352 U.S. at 374, 77S. Ct. at 417.
124. See, e.g., Texas Pattern Jury Charge 2.01:
"Ordinary care" means that degree of care which would be used by a person
of ordinary prudence under the same or similar circumstances.
"Negligence" means failure to use ordinary care; that is to say, failure to
do that which a person of ordinary prudence would have done under the same
or similar circumstances, or doing that which a person of ordinary prudence

would not have done under the same or similar circumstances.
I Texas Pattern Jury Charges 45 (1969).

125. 328 U.S. 1,66 S.Ct. 869 (1946).
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term "master of member of a crew of any vessel."'12 6 If the worker
pursues Jones Act rights, he must show crew member status. If he
pursues LHWCA rights, he must show the absence of crew member
status. 27 The courts have frequently stated that the criteria for determining crew member status are the same in Jones Act and LHWCA

cases.

128

But theoretical mutual exclusivity does not mean full mutual exclusivity in practice. "[Tihe Longshoremen's Act, like the Jones Act, requires a liberal interpretation in favor of claimants to effect its
purposes.' ' 29 In borderline situations, a finding of fact that the worker
is covered by the system he invokes will be sustained, despite the
realization that the same worker might have been able to sustain coverage
under the other system. 30 "[I]n a practical sense, a 'zone of uncertainty'
inevitably connects the two Acts."''
The administrative tribunals in which LHWCA claims are heard
have often resorted to the "liberal interpretation" view in order to hold
the worker entitled to LHWCA benefits despite indications that the
Jones Act courts would have found him to be a seaman.'
In McDermott, Inc. v. Boudreaux' the Fifth Circuit questioned that attitude.
Reversing the Benefits Review Board's finding that the worker was
covered by LHWCA, the court acknowledged the existence of the "zone
of uncertainty" and the tradition of liberal interpretation of both statutes, 3 4 but concluded that the administrative tribunals had erred as a
matter of law in concluding the worker was not a seaman on the ground
that he was not aboard the vessel primarily in aid of navigation. The
court held that Robison replaced the "aid of navigation" element with
the much more inclusive element of contribution "to the function,
mission, or maintenance of a vessel in navigation."' 33 On the McDermott

126. See, e.g., Ward v. Department of Labor, Office of Workers' Compensation
Programs, 684 F.2d 1114 (5th Cir. 1982), (reversing the Benefits Review Board's denial
of LHWCA coverage), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 815 (1983); McDermott, Inc. v. Boudreaux,
679 F.2d 452 (5th Cir. 1982) (reversing the Benefits Review Board's grant of LHWCA
coverage).
127. The Fifth Circuit cases typically mention this equivalency. See, e.g., Parks v.
Dowell Div. of Dow Chem. Corp., 712 F.2d 154, 157-58 (5th Cir. 1983); Simms v. Valley
Line Co., 709 F.2d 409, 411 (5th Cir. 1983); Bouvier v. Krenz, 702 F.2d 89, 91 (5th
Cir. 1983).
128. McDermott, 679 F.2d at 459.
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. See, e.g., Williams v. Halliburton Serv., 12 Ben. Rev. Bd. Serv. 116, 119 (A.L.J.)
(Oct. 14, 1980).
133. McDermott, 679 F.2d 452 (5th Cir. 1982).
134. Id.at 459.
135. Id.at 458.
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majority's view, the Robison criteria meant that the worker was a seaman

as a matter of law, and hence was excluded from LHWCA coverage;
the court stated that it was "at a loss to understand the total disregard
of Robison and its progeny in the proceedings below."' 3 6 Judge Garwood's dissent made a persuasive case that seaman status was a question

of fact and urged remand to the administrative law judge for findings
in accordance with the correct legal standards.' 37
McDermott means that a worker who can be classified as a seaman
as a matter of law will be excluded from LHWCA coverage as a matter
of law. But some workers are ambiguously enough situated that a claim

under either statute might well be sustained. Counsel for a worker who
may be covered under one or the other (or, as a practical matter, both)
the Jones Act and LHWCA systems will have to try to protect the
worker's rights under both systems.' 38 As is indicated by the following
summary of the current jurisprudence, only a few of the potential
problems have been clearly answered. Full treatment of this matter is
beyond the scope of the present article, but possibly some general
guidance can be suggested.
Broadly speaking, the difficult questions are the proper application

of the doctrines of election of remedies, collateral estoppel, and res
judicata. In very general and somewhat simplistic terms, 13 9 a binding
election of remedies may be made when a litigant is confronted with a
40
choice of two mutually exclusive avenues and opts for one of them.

136. Id.
137. Id. at 460-63. As indicated earlier, McDermott seems wrong in concluding that
the worker was a seaman as a matter of law. See supra notes 110-11 and accompanying
text.
138. Frequently counsel for an injured maritime worker will have an obligation to
seek seaman status, while at the same time attempting to preserve LHWCA rights in the
event the seaman's claim fails. If the current jurisprudence furnishes a colorable seaman
status argument, vigorous pursuit of the client's interests demands the effort. In addition,
the claimant's counsel fees for pursuing LHWCA rights are quite limited as compared
to the contingent fees potentially available in Jones Act cases, furnishing an additional
motivation for workers' counsel to pursue doubtful seaman status claims. To the extent
that the court can clarify the criteria for seaman status-whether by adopting the Wallace
approach, as suggested above, or otherwise-the number of situations in which dubious
claims of seaman status are made will be diminished. Society is obviously benefited if
courts are not inundated with such claims; valuable judicial time and resources can be
much better spent. See G. Gilmore & C. Black, The Law of Admiralty 328 (2d ed. 1975)
(deploring the "substantial volume of depressing [status] litigation"). Workers who are
confined to LHWCA are benefited if they and their counsel can know that at the outset;
the range of problems discussed below will not arise in such cases. And clarification is
of obvious benefit to marine employers and insurers.
139. See generally F. James & G. Hazard, Civil Procedure 527-99 (2d ed. 1977).
140. See Landry v. Carlson Mooring Serv. 643 F.2d 1080, 1087 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
454 U.S. 1123 (1981).

LOUISIANA LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 45

Collateral estoppel (often called issue preclusion) works to prevent the
relitigation of issues settled in earlier proceedings. Res judicata (often
called claim preclusion) subdivides into the concepts of bar, whereby a
judgment against the plaintiff concludes his rights on that cause of
action, and merger, whereby a judgment in the plaintiff's favor exhausts
his rights on that cause of action.
The application of the foregoing doctrines to the worker seeking to
protect or pursue potential rights under both the Jones Act and LHWCA
is presently unclear.' 4' The following summary presents a range of situations that can occur and indicates the apparent effect of the relevant
jurisprudence to date. (It should be noted that this discussion does not
address the separate range of problems raised by full or partial releases
or waivers that an employer or insurer might secure or attempt to secure
in the course of these proceedings.)
Effect of LHWCA Proceedings on the Jones Act Suit
Merely accepting voluntarily-paid LHWCA benefits without filing a
LHWCA claim will not adversely affect the Jones Act suit.' 42 If the
Jones Act suit is ultimately successful, the employer will be entitled to
43
a credit for LHWCA benefits paid.'
Filing a LHWCA claim probably does not constitute a binding
election of remedies or otherwise estop the worker from bringing a Jones
Act suit.' 44 But counsel should probably include with the LHWCA filing
an appropriate statement that attempts to reserve rights to proceed under
the Jones Act.
An unsuccessful LHWCA proceeding will not bar a subsequent Jones
Act suit on res judicata grounds.' 45 Nor, in all probability, will the res

141. See Simms v. Valley Line Co., 709 F.2d 409, 412 (5th Cir. 1983).
142. Tipton v. Socony Mobile Oil Co., 375 U.S. 34, 84 S. Ct. 1 (1963), held that it
was reversible error in petitioner's Jones Act suit to admit evidence that he had accepted
LHWCA benefits. The Fifth Circuit court has frequently indicated that merely accepting
voluntarily-paid LHWCA benefits will not estop plaintiff from pursuing his Jones Act
remedy. See Simms v. Valley Line Co., 709 F.2d at 412; Young & Co. v. Shea, 397
F.2d 185, 187 (5th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 920 (1969); Burks v. American
River Transp. Co., 679 F.2d 69, 75 (5th Cir. 1982) (declaring plaintiff's acceptance of
LHWCA benefits to be part of its reasoning leading to the conclusion that he was covered
by LHWCA.
143. See Simms, 709 F.2d at 412 n.3).
144. In Boatel, 379 F.2d at 854-56, the court held that filing a LHWCA claim does
not prevent the plaintiff from bringing a seaman's suit. But it should be noted that
McDermott, 679 F.2d at 459 n.7, states that "even the ambiguous employee must elect
a remedy," citing Ocean Drilling & Exploration Co. v. Berry Bros. Oilfield Serv., 377
F.2d 511, 514 (5th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 849 (1967). Ocean Drilling has no
apparent application on the election of remedies point.
145. See Boatel, 379 F.2d at 856.
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Jones Act suit foljudicata doctrine of merger preclude a subsequent
46
lowing a successful LHWCA proceeding.1
However, regardless of the outcome of the LHWCA proceeding, it
may produce findings of fact that create collateral estoppel problems

in the subsequent Jones Act proceeding. Before the recent decision in
Simms v. Valley Line Co. 147 the cases seemed to indicate that a LHWCA
finding will collaterally estop relitigation of the same issue in the Jones
Act proceeding if and only if the issue was in fact fully litigated in the
LHWCA proceeding, 14 and the party invoking collateral estoppel was

not the beneficiary of an evidentiary or procedural advantage in the
49
LHWCA proceeding that does not obtain in the Jones Act proceeding.
Simms, however, suggests that collateral estoppel may be wholly inappropriate in the Jones Act suit, 50 and that these issues are "a matter

146. See Mike Hooks, Inc. v. Pena, 313 F.2d 696 (5th Cir. 1963). While the preJones Act proceeding in Mike Hooks was a state workers' compensation proceeding, the
result should be the same in LHWCA proceedings, for it is clear that Jones Act seamen
are precluded from access to state workers' compensation remedies, just as is true of the
LHWCA remedy. See, e.g., Dupre v. Otis Eng'g Corp., 641 F.2d 229 (5th Cir. 1981);
Bearden v. Leon C. Breaux Towing Co., 365 So. 2d 1192 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1978), cert.
denied, 366 S. 2d 915 (1979). Mike Hooks, which involved both collateral estoppel and
res judicata arguments, was actually decided on the narrow ground that the employer,
defendant in the Jones Act suit, was not "really a party" to the workers' compensation
proceeding, which was against the compensation insurer. 313 F.2d at 700-02. But, at least
on the res judicata point, the case can probably support the proposition in the text,
147. Sims, 709 F.2d 409 (5th Cir. 1983).
148. The LHWCA proceeding may achieve explicit or implicit factual determinations
on issues that are controlling in the Jones Act suit. For example, an award of LHWCA
compensation entails a finding that the plaintiff was not a seaman. One case holds that
if the lack of seaman status was fully litigated in the LHWCA proceeding, that finding
precludes relitigating the status issue in the Jones Act suit. See Welch v. Elevating Boats,
516 F. Supp. 1245, 1248 (E.D. La. 1981). But if the status finding was not achieved
after full litigation, it will not collaterally estop plaintiff from seeking to establish seaman
status in the Jones Act suit. See Mike Hooks, 313 F.2d at 696. Cf. Boatel, 379 F.2d at
854-56.
149. Several cases have involved a worker's pursuit of LHWCA rights following a
Jones Act proceeding in which the trier of fact concluded there was no actionable injury.
The court has refused to give collateral estoppel effect to such findings on the ground
that LHWCA gives the worker a lesser burden of establishing injury. See Strachan Shipping
Co. v. Shea, 406 F.2d 521, 522 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 921 (1969); Young &
Co., 397 F.2d at 188-89. Cf. Teichman v. Loffland Bros. Co., 294 F.2d 175 (5th Cir.),
cert. denied, 368 U.S. 948 (1961). The same reasoning should preclude plaintiff from
relying on collateral estoppel in a Jones Act proceeding as to any determination made
in the LHWCA proceeding on a standard of proof more favorable to plaintiff than is
true in Jones Act cases.
150. In Simms, the status issue was fully litigated in the LHWCA proceeding, which
concluded that the worker was not a seaman. 709 F.2d at 410. Yet the court indicated,
without discussion, that it might well be proper for the Jones Act court to "refuse to
give collateral effect to the status determination." Id. at 413 n.6.
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of first impression . . . and . . .uncertainty" in the Fifth Circuit. 5"
Effect of Jones Act or Maintenance and Cure Proceedings on
the Worker's LHWCA Rights
Merely accepting maintenance and cure benefits should have no effect
on the LHWCA proceeding. 5 2 Neither should filing a seaman's suit;
this should not constitute a binding election of remedies or otherwise
estop the worker from pursuing LHWCA rights.' However, counsel
should include in the complaint an attempted reservation of the worker's
54
LHWCA rights.
An unsuccessful seaman's suit will not bar a subsequent LHWCA
proceeding on res judicata grounds.' It is not clear whether a successful
seaman's suit would preclude subsequent LHWCA proceedings on res
judicata (merger) grounds. 5 6
Regardless of its outcome, the Jones Act suit is likely to produce
findings of fact that generate collateral estoppel arguments in the subsequent LHWCA proceeding. Several cases have refused to use collateral
estoppel against the worker when the Jones Act findings are made under
procedural and evidentiary standards that are less generous to the worker
than the LHWCA standards.'5 7 Presumably that reasoning suggests that
collateral estoppel would apply whenever the issue was fully litigated in
the Jones Act suit and the party invoking collateral estoppel did not
enjoy a procedural or evidentiary advantage in the Jones Act suit that
would not be available in the LHWCA proceeding. But there is no help
in the jurisprudence on that question.
All of the foregoing matters demand clarification by the court.
Simms v. Valley Line Co.' shows the difficulty of the ambiguous
worker's position. Uncertain as to his status, Simms filed both a Jones
Act suit and LHWCA claim. He tried to have the LHWCA proceeding

151. Id.at 412.
152. The cases holding that accepting LHWCA payments does not affect the worker's
right to pursue seamen's remedies should entail this conclusion. See supra notes 142-43
and accompanying text.
153. See generally Simms, 709 F.2d 409 (5th Cir. 1983).
154. Id.
155. See Strachan Shipping Co., 406 F.2d at 521; Young & Co., 397 F.2d at 185.
Cf. Teichman, 294 F.2d at 175.
156. The 1984 amendments to LHWCA add a new subsection (e) to § 903, providing
that a LHWCA employer is entitled to a credit for any benefits previously paid under
the Jones Act. LHWCA Amendments, supra note 5, at 1640 (to be codified at 33 U.S.C
§ 903(e)). This implies that a successful Jones Act suit would not bar a subsequent
LHWCA proceeding on res judicata grounds. But cf. Jones v. Baton Rouge Marine
Contractors, 127 So. 2d 58 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1961), cert. denied.
157. See the Strachan, Young, and Teichman cases, cited supra note 149.
158. 709 F.2d 409 (5th Cir. 1983).
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stayed pending the outcome of the Jones Act suit, but the administrative
law judge denied that motion. In the LHWCA hearing, the employer
contended that Simms was not a seaman, the workers' compensation
insurer contended that he was a seaman, and Simms tried to occupy a
middle ground by urging that he not be "in any way prejudiced" in
his pursuit of LHWCA and Jones Act rights. The administrative law
judge determined that Simms was not a seaman, and made an award.
The workers' compensation insurer appealed to the Benefits Review
Board, and Simms sought to join the appeal, contending that the administrative law judge had erred in denying the stay, again requesting
that he not be "in any way prejudiced" in his LHWCA and Jones Act
claims. The Benefits Review Board dismissed Simms' appeal on the
ground that he was not a party adversely affected by the administrative
law judge's determinations inasmuch as he had been awarded the LHWCA
benefits for which he filed. Simms then sought to appeal to the Fifth
Circuit, but the appeal was dismissed as premature. The court discussed
the difficulties of a worker in Simms' position, indicated that most of
the important election of remedies, collateral estoppel, and res judicata
issues are unsettled, and expressed its apparent hope that the determinations of which Simms complained would be mooted by the Jones Act
judge's refusal to give collateral estoppel effect to the administrative
law judge's status determination.5 9
One may hope that Simms is a signal from the court that, when
an appropriate case presents itself, the court may be ready to clarify
the situation. Pending that clarification, counsel for both injured workers
and employers must be alert to the potential application of the doctrines
discussed. If claimant's counsel finds it necessary to file under both the
Jones Act and LHWCA, each filing should be accompanied by an
attempted reservation of rights under the other system. If possible, the
claimant should seek to delay the LHWCA proceeding until the Jones
Act suit is determined. Both claimants and employers should be aware
that findings of fact in either proceeding may be binding in the subsequent proceeding, particularly if the matter is fully litigated under
procedural and evidentiary standards that give no advantage not available
in the subsequent proceeding to the party invoking collateral estoppel.
And once the first proceeding is concluded, the employer's counsel should
probably urge res judicata (bar or merger) in the second.
UNSEAWORTHINESS

ACTIONS By WORKERS

NOT COVERED By LHWCA
The typical unseaworthiness action is brought by a seaman, a member
of the crew of the vessel on which injury is sustained, against the vessel's
159.

709 F.2d at 413 n.6.
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owner or operator,' 60 who is the plaintiff's employer.1 6' The 1946 Supreme Court decision in Seas Shipping Co. v. Sierackil62 expanded the
unseaworthiness remedy in two ways, holding that longshoremen can
sue shipowners on the basis of unseaworthiness, and that unseaworthiness
liability can be imposed although the defendant shipowner is not the
employer of the injured worker.163 Subsequently, the Court decided that
the non-employer shipowner, held liable on the basis of unseaworthiness
created by the injured longshoreman's employer, was entitled to indemnity from the employer on the basis of a warranty of workmanlike
performance of the stevedoring operations (Ryan indemnity)."
The result of the foregoing decisions was to expose the employer
of workers covered by LHWCA to full tort liability in most cases in
which unseaworthiness could be shown, despite the Act's provision for
workers' compensation as the employer's exclusive liability. 65 Congress
determined to change that situation in 1972. As part of an extensive
revision of LHWCA, Congress added a new section 905(b) to the Act,
the major effect of which is to provide that no employee covered by
LHWCA may maintain litigation based on unseaworthiness.' 66 The new
section effectively eliminates the Sieracki action and the corresponding
Ryan indemnity respecting injuries to any employee covered by LHWCA.
The effects of the 1972 amendment remain somewhat unclear on
two fronts. First, there has been debate as to whether longshoremen

160. To be liable for unseaworthiness, the defendant need not be the vessel's owner.
It is enough that he own, operate, or be in control of the vessel. See, e.g., Baker v.
Raymond Int'l, Inc., 656 F.2d 173, 181 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 983 (1982).
Furthermore, unseaworthiness liability carries a maritime lien, so that the vessel can be
sued in rem by a plaintiff entitled to the remedy. In this section of the article, the term
"shipowner" refers to the vessel, its owner, or its operator. Distinctions among those
entities are not relevant to the matters treated here.
161. See, e.g., Mitchell v. Trawler Racer, Inc., 362 U.S. 539, 80 S. Ct. 926 (1960).
162. 328 U.S. 85, 66 S. Ct. 872 (1946).
163. The pre-Sieracki cases were unclear as to whether an employment relationship
between the plaintiff and the unseaworthiness defendant was a requisite. See the cases
and commentators cited 328 U.S. at 88 nn.3-4, 66 S. Ct. at 874 nn.3-4.
164. See Ryan Stevedoring Co. v. Pan-Atlantic S.S. Corp., 350 U.S. 124, 76 S. Ct.
272 (1956). Once Ryan was decided, the immunity from tort liability ostensibly conferred
on the LHWCA employer by the Act was defeated, and it was a fairly easy step for the
Court next to conclude that a longshoreman in the direct employ of the shipowner could
sue the employer/shipowner on the basis of unseaworthiness. See Reed v. The S.S. Yaka,
373 U.S. 410, 83 S. Ct. 1349 (1963). See also supra note 6.
165. Both before and after the 1972 amendments, 33 U.S.C. § 905 provided that the
employer's liability for worker's compensation "shall be exclusive and in place of all
other liability of such employer to the employee, his legal representative, husband or wife,
parents, dependents, next of kin, and anyone otherwise entitled to recover damages from
such employer at law or in admiralty on account of such injury or death."
166. 33 U.S.C. § 905(b) (1983).

1985]

MARITIME PERSONAL INJURY

and harbor workers who are not covered by LHWCA have lost the
unseaworthiness remedy. Courts in the Third,

167

Fourth,

168

Sixth, ' 69 and

70

Ninth Circuits
have suggested with varying degrees of clarity and
7
conviction' ' that all such workers, whether or not covered by LHWCA,
are precluded from suing on the basis of unseaworthiness. The Fifth
Circuit Court has firmly reached the opposite conclusion. In Aparicio
v. Swan Lake 7 2 the court held that workers who are not covered by
LHWCA because they are beyond its territorial coverage7 3 or because
they are excluded from LHWCA coverage as federally-employed.
longshoremen 74 or otherwise not within the LHWCA's coverage 175 retain
the right to sue the owners of ships on which they are injured on the
basis of unseaworthiness. Aparicio clearly states the present law in the
Fifth Circuit.

76

167. See Lynn v. Heyl and Patterson, Inc., 483 F. Supp. 1247 (W.D. Pa. 1980), aff'd,
636 F.2d 1209 (3d Cir. 1981), in which the court denied plaintiff's unseaworthiness action
on the basis of 33 U.S.C. § 905(b) but also held that plaintiff was not within the coverage
of LHWCA.
168. See United States Lines, Inc. v. United States, 593 F.2d 570 (4th Cir. 1979), in
which the court held that the 1972 amendment to LHWCA had no "direct effect" on
federally-employed longshoremen (who are excluded from LHWCA coverage by the terms
of 33 U.S.C. § 903(a)(2) because they are covered by the Federal Employees' Compensation
Act, 5 U.S.C. § 8101 et seq.), but that the Ryan indemnity against the federal employer
was nevertheless cut off as an "indirect effect" of the LHWCA amendment. See also
Quinn v. Central Gulf S.S. Corp., 1977 A.M.C. 204 (D. Md. 1977).
169. See Freeborn v. Upper Lakes Shipping, Ltd., 541 F. Supp. 1099 (W.D. Mich.
1982) (following United States Line, 593 F.2d at 570).
170. See Normile v. Maritime Co. of the Philippines, 643 F.2d 1380 (9th Cir. 1981)
(holding that Sieracki has been entirely overruled).
171. See supra notes 167-70.
172. 643 F.2d 1109 (5th Cir. 1981).
173. LHWCA is confined by its own terms to "the navigable waters of the United
States," 33 U.S.C. § 903(a) (1983), which has generally been interpreted to mean inland
waters and waters out to the marine league line. See, e.g., Cormier v. Oceanic Contractors,
Inc., 696 F.2d 1112 (5th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 85 (1983); Mahramas v.
American Export Isbrandtsen Lines, Inc., 475 F.2d 165, 169 & n.3 (2d Cir. 1973). But
see Fox v. Taylor Diving & Salvage Co., 694 F.2d 1349 (5th Cir. 1983); Cove Tankers
Corp. v. United Ship Repair, Inc., 683 F.2d 38 (2d Cir. 1982). LHWCA has been extended
by specific provision in the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act (OCSLA) to cover injuries
occurring as the result of mineral operations on the Shelf. 43 U.S.C. § 1333(b) (1983).
But neither on its own terms nor via the OCSLA would LHWCA cover workers in foreign
waters. But see Fox, 694 F.2d at 1349.
174. See 33 U.S.C. § 903(a)(2) (1983).
175. See Miller v. Central Dispatch, Inc., 673 F.2d 773, 784 (5th Cir. 1982) (noting
that a waterfront worker covered only by state workers' compensation would presumably
be entitled to sue on the basis of unseaworthiness).
176. See Cormier v. Oceanic Contractors, Inc., 696 F.2d at 1112.
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The second question is whether a seaman can sue a non-employing
7
it had not been clear
shipowner for unseaworthiness.' v7 Before Sieracki1
whether an employment relationship between the plaintiff and the defendant shipowner was a requisite to recovery for unseaworthiness. 79
But once Sieracki was decided, the courts routinely held that seamen
were entitled to the unseaworthiness remedy although not employed by
-the defendant shipowner.'8 0 In many of these cases, the plaintiff was a

177. The Oceanographic Vessels Research Act (ORVA), 46 U.S.C. § 441-45 (1983),
creates a category of seamen who are precluded from Jones Act rights but may maintain
maintenance and cure proceedings and unseaworthiness actions against their employers.
See Presley v. The Vessel Caribbean Seal, 709 F.2d 406 (5th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 104
S. Ct. 699 (1984) (holding that "scientific personnel" aboard "oceanographic research
vessels" are, by the terms of ORVA, foreclosed from the Jones Act but not from their
general maritime law rights). Presley relied on Judge Rubin's analysis of ORVA in Sennett
v. Shell Oil Co., 325 F. Supp. I (E.D. La. 1971). (ORVA also forecloses the survivors
of these seamen from litigation on the basis of the Death on the High Seas Act, 46
U.S.C. § 761 et seq. (1983). The death remedies are under Moragne v. States Marine
Lines, 398 U.S. 375, 90 S. Ct. 1772 (1970). See Sennett, 325 F. Supp. at 6-8.) Presumably
these crew members could also sue non-employer shipowners for unseaworthiness under
the same circumstances that make such actions available to ordinary crew members.
178. Sieraki, 328 U.S. at 85, 66 S. Ct. at 872.
179. See supra note 163.
180. See Davis v. Hill Eng'g, Inc., 549 F.2d 314, 326-28, 329-30 (5th Cir. 1977) (The
plaintiff, a member of the crew of the vessel on which he was injured, was a fortiori
entitled to sue the non-employer shipowner for unseaworthiness.); Mahramas v. American
Export lsbrandtsen Lines, Inc., 475 F.2d 165, 169, 170 (2d Cir. 1973) (A hairdresser on
a passenger vessel, employed by House of Albert, was a seaman who could sue Albert
under the Jones Act and obtain maintenance and cure and AmEx, the non-employer
shipowner. for unseaworthiness;); Clark v. Svmonette Shiovards. Ltd.. 330 F.2d 554, 55657 (5th Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 387 U.S. 908 (1967) (Workers injured on the defendant's
vessel were held entitled to the unseaworthiness action whether or not they were classified
as seamen or as members of the vessel's crew); Reilly v. B No. 100 Corp., 424 F. Supp.
935, 936-37 (E.D.N.Y. 1977) (Seaman by virtue of his connection with a barge, and who
was injured on the barge, was held entitled to maintain an unseaworthiness action against
the non-employing owner of the tug); Evans v. J. Ray McDermott, Inc., 342 F. Supp.
1390, 1391, 1393 (E.D. La. 1972) (same); Welch v. J. Ray McDermott & Co., 336 F. Supp.
383, 384, 385 (W.D. La. 1972) (The plaintiff, who worked for a welding inspection contractor aboard the non-employing shipowner's pipelay barge, was a seaman, entitled to sue
the shipowner for unseaworthiness of the living quarters on the barge.); Case v. St. Paul
Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 324 F. Supp. 352, 353 (E.D. La. 1971) (A roughneck assigned
to a submersible barge operated and controlled by the non-employer defendant had an
unseaworthiness action); Smith v. Brown & Root Marine Operators, Inc., 243 F. Supp.
130, 132, 136 (W.D. La. 1965) (The plaintiff, who was diving from the non-employer defendant's barge, was a seaman, entitled to the unseaworthiness remedy.); Farmer v. The O/S
Fluffy D, 220 F. Supp. 917, 921 (S.D. Tex. 1963) (The captain of shrimp boat "A", killed
in a fight during a drinking bout aboard shrimp boat "B", was entitled to sue the owner
of "B" for unseaworthiness.); Bradshaw v. The CarolAnn, 163 F. Supp. 366, 369-70 (S.D.
Tex. 1956) (A crew member of shrimp boat "A", which was moored in such a way as
to require crew members to cross the deck of boat "B" to get to and from shore, had
an unseaworthiness action against boat "B".); Capadona v. The Lake Atlin, 101 F. Supp.
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member of the crew of the vessel whose unseaworthiness caused the
injury. 8' Yet a significant number of the decisions permitted unseaworthiness actions by seamen who were aboard the offending vessel only

transiently, in the course of cargo operations or for other purposes. 8 2
The post-amendment decisions in which seamen sued non-employing
shipowners on the basis of unseaworthiness are not fully consistent with
the above pattern. Apparently workers who are crew members of the

vessel on which injury occurs are still entitled to sue non-employing
shipowners for the unseaworthiness of that vessel." 3 But Burks v. American River Transporation Co. I1 4 holds that a worker, arguendo a seaman
by virtue of his connection to Vessel "A", who was injured while
temporarily aboard Vessel "B" engaged in unloading operations, was
prevented by the 1972 amendment to LHWCA from suing the owner

of Vessel "B" for its unseaworthiness. The court held that, as to Vessel
"B", plaintiff was doing the work of a longshoreman and was therefore
a covered employee under LHWCA. 85 The core of the decision is the

notion that a worker is excluded from LHWCA coverage as a "member
of a crew of any vessel"'' 86 only if he is a member of the crew of the
vessel he is suing. 8 7 Burks represents a very strained construction of
the language of LHWCA;'88 it holds that with respect to the availability

851, 852 (S.D. Cal. 1951) (A member of the crew of a fueling barge had an unseaworthiness action against the ship being fueled.). Cf. Cotten v. Two "R" Drilling Co., 508
F.2d 669 (5th Cir. 1975); Dugas v. Pelican Constr. Co., 481 F.2d 773 (5th Cir.), cert. denied
sub nom. Union Oil Co. v. Dugas, 414 U.S. 1093 (1973); Whisenant v. Brewster-Bartle
Offshore Co., 446 F.2d 394 (5th Cir. 1971).
181. See the Davis, Mahramas, Evans, Welch, Case, and Smith cases cited supra note
180.
182. See the Reilly, Clark, Farmer, Bradshaw, and Capadona cases cited supra note
180.
183. Several decisions so hold, without discussion of LHWCA. See Baker v. Raymond
Int'l, 656 F.2d at 181-85 (injury in Persian Gulf, so beyond reach of LHWCA); Kwak
Hyung Rok v. Continental Seafoods, Inc., 462 F. Supp. 894, 896, 898 (S.D. Ala. 1978),
aff'd, 614 F.2d 292 (5th Cir. 1980) (The captain of a vessel would have an unseaworthiness
action against a non-employer entity responsible for readying the vessel for a voyage if
that entity operated, managed, or controlled the vessel.); Hamilton v. Canal Barge Co.,
395 F. Supp. 978, 982, 988 (E.D. La. 1975) (A member of the crew of an unseaworthy
barge was entitled to recover against an owner who chartered it to the worker's employer.).
184. 679 F.2d 69 (5th Cir. 1982).
185. Id.at 75.
186. 33 U.S.C. § 902(3), 903(a)(1) (1983).
187. Id.at 76. The court stated that "the 'member of a crew' language in § 905(b)
clearly refers to the vessel that ischarged with negligence." There isno such language
in § 905(b), which isaddressed to "a person covered under this chapter." The relevant
language isin §§ 902(3) and 903(a)(1). And of course there is nothing "clear" about the
court's leap; "member of a crew of any vessel" isnot the same as "member of a crew
of the vessel being sued."
188. See supra note 187.
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of the unseaworthiness remedy-but clearly not with respect to other
features of the Act' 89-"any vessel" means "the vessel whose owner is
being sued." Burks is inconsistent with a number of the pre-1972 decisions. '9 It seems to take the 1972 amendments to LHWCA beyond
their intended compass. Further, it is a strange policy that holds shorebased workers 91 and other harbor workers who happen to be beyond
the reach of LHWCA because of federal employment or LHWCA's
territorial reach1 92 entitled to the unseaworthiness remedy while denying
it to a seaman. If longshoremen need not be members of the crew of
the defective vessel in order to sue for its unseaworthiness, why should
such status be required of seamen?
Several other recent decisions also involved the worker, clearly a
seaman by virtue of his connection to one vessel, who sustains injury
while temporarily involved with another vessel not owned or operated
by the employer. Three such cases, without overt reliance on LHWCA,
denied the unseaworthiness action on the theory that, as to the vessel
where injury occurred, plaintiff was merely a passenger. 93 These decisions
are inconsistent with several of the pre-1972 cases.1 94 Further, there is
some strain at the level of policy between these cases and the Aparicio
line of decisions, in which some shore-based and other harbor workers
have been permitted the unseaworthiness remedy against non-employers.195

Easily the most puzzling decision bearing on the questions under
discussion is Bridges v. Penrod Drilling Co. 196 Plaintiff was a roustabout
employed by Penrod and assigned to Penrod's submersible drilling barge,
the Penrod 72. He was a seaman by virtue of that connection. 97 His
injuries occurred aboard a supply vessel that he was assigned to unload.
The court held that such a plaintiff has no unseaworthiness action against
the owner of the supply vessel.1 98 In its result, Bridges is thus identical
to Burks.' 99 But the reasoning process is wholly different. The court

189. See Robertson, supra note 7, at 989.
190. See supra note 182 and accompanying text.
191.

See Miller, 673 F.2d at 773.

192. See Aparicio, 643 F.2d at 1149; Cormier, 696 F.2d at 1112.
193. See Dove v. Belcher Oil Co., 686 F.2d 329, 332-33 (5th Cir. 1982); Roberts v.
Williams-McWilliams Co., Inc., 648 F.2d 255, 258, 263 (5th Cir. 1981); Garrett v. United
States Lines, Inc., 574 F.2d 997, 998, 1000 (9th Cir. 1978).
194. See supra note 182 and accompanying text.
195. See supra notes 172-76 and accompanying text.
196. 740 F.2d 361 (5th Cir. 1984).
197. Id. at 362.
198. The issue before the Bridges court was Ryan indemnity, but the court reasoned
that the answer to that question depended on whether there was a Sieracki action. Id.
at 363-64.
199. 679 F.2d at 69.
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began its discussion by stating that the LHWCA did not apply, apparently on territorial grounds.3°° On that premise, plaintiff should cer-

tainly have been entitled to sue the non-employer shipowner on the basis
of unseaworthiness, on the authority of Aparicio and the other cases
so holding.2"' But the court seemed to believe, contrary to a lengthy line
of jurisprudence, °2 that seamen had never been afforded the benefits of
the Sieracki action:
The issue presented on this appeal is not "whether landlubbers
who do sailor's work aboard ships were dislodged from their
Sieracki seaman status by the wake of the 1972 amendments"
to the LHWCA, Aparicio, 643 F.2d at 1110, but whether a

seaman whose duties include doing the unloading work of a
longshoreman, in a setting not subject to the LHWCA, by some
act of legal legerdemain leaves his regular seaman status and
joins a "pocket of Sieracki seamen." We are persuaded that
no such transformation occurs. None need occur.2 03
Without citing any authority, the court went on to state something that
is contrary to dozens and perhaps hundreds of cases:

200. The Penrod 72 was situated on the outer continental shelf, where LHWCA applies,
not of its own force, but by virtue of its extension via the Outer Continental Shelf Lands
Act (OCSLA), 43 U.S.C. § 1333(b) (1983). See supra note 173. The Bridges court stated
that the OCSLA extension did not cover "rigs such as the semi-submersible PENROD
72" until the 1978 amendments to that Act. 740 F.2d at 362. But the portion of OCSLA
that makes LHWCA applicable to Shelf injuries did not change in any relevant way in
1978. Compare the former 43 U.S.C. § 1333(c) (1976) with the present 43 U.S.C. §
1333(b) (1983). The court's statement must therefore have been based on a 1978 change
to the general OCSLA provision extending United States law to the Shelf, 43 U.S.C. §
1333 (a)(l) (1983). Before 1978, that section read in pertinent part:
The Constitution and laws and civil and political jurisdiction of the United
States are extended to the subsoil and seabed of the outer Continental Shelf
and to all artifical islands and fixed structures which may be erected thereon.
43 U.S.C.§ 1333(a)(1) (1976). After the 1978 amendment, the section read in pertinent
part:
The Constitution and laws and civil and political jurisdiction of the United
States are extended to the suboil and seabed of the outer Continental Shelf and
to all artificial islands, and all installations and other devices permanently or
temporarily attached to the seabed, which may be erected thereon. ...
43 U.S.C. § 1333(a)(1) (1983). The Bridges court apparently reasoned that the pre-1978
absence of the language referring to temporary structures meant that none of OCSLA,
including the section making LHWCA applicable, applied to submersible barges before
1978. But the pre-1978 jurisprudence was to the contrary. See Robertson, supra note 7,
at 985-86. The pre-1978 cases simply did not take the language of the general section as
delimiting the coverage of the LHWCA-extension section.
201. See supra notes 172-76 and accompanying text.
202. See, e.g., cases cited supra note 180.
203. 740 F.2d at 364.
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One with seaman status does not become additionally a Sieracki
seaman by doing stevedoring
work which might be styled tra2
ditional seaman's duties. 04
Burks seems wrong as a matter of policy and in its torturing of
the language of LHWCA. Bridges is just as wrong on the policy and
wronger yet in its understanding of the predecessor jurisprudence. If
the unseaworthiness remedy is to be available in any circumstances other
than the paradigm, seaman plaintiff against his employer/shipowner,
then it should have been available in Burks and Bridges. For no apparent
reason, the court has taken a giant step backward.

204.

Id. at 364.

